1、澳大利亚公私伙伴关系的绩效审计使政府的政策合法化或提供独立的监督外文翻译原文：Performance Audit of Australian Public Private Partnerships：Legitimising Government Policies or Providing Independent Oversight?PERFORMANCE AUDIT OVERSIGHT OF PPPs: INSIGHTS FROM THE LITERATUREIn performance audits, audit criteria are the benchmarks against whi
2、ch the activities of audited bodies are compared, and upon which audit conclusions and recommendations rely. These criteria are a largely uncodified set of standards about what constitutes good practice (Pollitt et al., 1999; and Gendron et al.,2001). Consequently, the criteria, and their use in per
3、formance audit, are crucial to its perceived ability to provide independent oversight of the effectiveness and management of program implementation.Confirming findings in Australia (Hamburger, 1989; Guthrie, 1989; and Guthrie and Parker, 1999) and international literature (Normanton, 1966; Gendron e
4、t al., 2001; and Cooper, 2003), Pollitt et al.s (1999) longitudinal study into performance audit practice found evidence of a fundamental link between NPM implementation and changing performance audit practice. Although there is general agreement about the origins and distinctive characteristics of
5、NPM and performance audits, their development and outworking are intertwined, contested, context-dependent and change over time (Guthrie and Parker, 1999; and Pollitt et al., 1999). Performance audit practice both influences, and is influenced by, NPM implementation (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; an
6、d Pollitt et al., 1999).Like NPM, performance audits are concerned with effectiveness and good management and raise questions about the use of best practice performance accountability frameworks as audit criteria (Pollitt et al., 1999; Gendron et al., 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; and Skrbk, 2
7、006). Some auditors general are actively engaged in developing these frameworks, and also appear to use them as audit criteria (often as a consequence of a desire to foster modernisation in the public sector (Skrbk, 2006). However, these activities also appear to legitimise government policy and hav
8、e been criticised as potentially compromising the ability of auditors-general to provide independent and effective oversight of the implementation of those policies (Gendron et al., 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; and Skrbk, 2006).Pollitt et al. (1999) classifies performance audits into two type
9、s: systemsbased and substantive. Systems-based audits essentially check adherence to procedures mandated by audited bodies (Pollitt et al., 1999) or to best practice frameworks promulgated by the auditors-general themselves (Gendron et al., 2001). They are, therefore, conducted on the premise that s
10、teering mechanisms represent good management practice criteria. Performance audit objectives have been considered to have been achieved when it is concluded that standards are conformed with (Pollitt et al., 1999).By contrast, substantive audits investigate the effectiveness of policy implementation
11、 in relation to core activities and the quality of service experienced by users against externally-derived criteria (Pollitt et al., 1999). They involve a degree of scepticism and some understanding of human nature and a willingness to independently recalculate benchmarks. They include some systems-
12、based elements to provide low-level assurance about adherence to internally-mandated steering mechanisms. However, substantive audits move beyond checking the effectiveness of adherence to internal control systems or audit-mandated performance frameworks. They disclose the ramifications of poorly im
13、plemented procedures supported by quantitative and qualitative explanations and examples, providing a richer understanding of reasons for performance failure, and the basis for conclusions and recommendations. Also, they may challenge the boundary between investigating the effectiveness of policies
14、per se and the effectiveness of policy implementation (Guthrie, 1989; Hamburger, 1989; and Pollitt et al., 1999), explaining the political sensitivity of performance audits. Substantive audits are costly both politically and in terms of time and labour (for example, they frequently involve the use o
15、f consultants) (Pollitt et al., 1999).Pollitt et al.s (1999) study found that most reviewed performance audits were systems-based. The exception was UK performance audits from 1993 to 1995,6 which were categorised as substantive. However, Gendron et al. (2001), previous Australian studies and PFI li
16、terature challenge these findings.UK literature argues that the substantive issue for performance audits in a PFI context is providing assurance about the achievement of anticipated risk transfer and VFM. This is accomplished by investigating whether the spending of public money (in the PFI operatin
17、g stage) is in accordance with contractual agreements (Edwards et al., 2004; and Pollock and Price, 2004); or concluding that no changes in contracted payment streams to government have occurred. Broadbent et al. (2004) call for PFI performance audits to broaden their investigation of VFM achievemen
18、t to include a broad range of ex post non-financial outcomes at the government, agency and project levels.The Australian performance audit literature finds that individual auditorsgeneral have adopted strikingly different interpretations of what performance audits are and how they should be conducte
19、d, resulting in observable differences in their conduct (Hamburger, 1989). Early Australian studies conclude that investigated performance audits tend to concentrate on economy and efficiency as opposed to effectiveness (Hatherly and Parker, 1988), confirming that auditing for effectiveness is a con
20、tentious and technically demanding activity (Pollitt et al., 1999).In summary, the literature suggests that PPP performance audits most frequently investigate systems-based adherence to steering mechanisms, rather than the substantive effectiveness of steering mechanism implementation in achieving s
21、tated objectives.RESEARCH METHODSThis research is based on a historically-informed documentary study of PPP steering mechanisms and performance audit reports (identified by Gendron et al., 2001, as a window through which researchers can understand how auditors-general socially construct performance
22、auditing at particular points in time). The first PPP performance audit report was published in 1994 and the most recent in May 2006. Initially, all reports were read independently by two researchers to identify the presence (or absence) of reference to the eleven items that constitute the PPP perfo
23、rmance audit framework. A small number of categorisation differences were settled consultatively. A code was allocated to each report to facilitate discussion of results.Finally, as revealed in Table 3, the reports were investigated to ascertain the primary impetus of the audit to determine whether
24、substantive audits shared any discernable context-bound elements that may influence the conduct of performance audit, such as type of PPP project, auditor-general and controversy surrounding the project/audit. Three broad triggers were identified: parliament, indicating that the audit had been forma
25、lly requested by a parliamentary resolution; public concern, indicating that the PPP project had attracted an unusual level of controversy, which was either acknowledged in the audit report or confirmed independently; and new project, indicating that the audit office had initiated the audit to revie
26、w the implementation of a new PPP project.PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTSResults related to each of the papers three objectives are addressed sequentiallyObjective 1: Document the Extent and Focus of Australian PPP Performance AuditsInterestingly, Table 3 reveals that audits which pre-date the
27、development of Partnerships Victoria steering mechanisms (PA1, PA2, PA3, PA4 and PA5), nevertheless engage with those steering mechanisms key procedures. This indicates that there was broad auditor-general awareness and understanding of the key elements of PPP arrangements prior to 2000. Table 3 dem
28、onstrates that the PPP steering mechanism framework (as set out in Table 2) accurately captures the extent and focus of Australian PPP performance audit. This confirms the use by auditors-general of steering mechanisms to provide guidance as to appropriate best practice criteria in systems-based aud
29、its and in the systems-based elements of substantive audits.It appears, however, that no Australian audit office strategically audits PPPs on an ongoing basis. New projects are the most frequent trigger for audit. The ad hoc nature of PPP auditing may be explained by a lack of resources and expertis
30、e in state audit offices. The focus of audits on the pre-contracting stage could be explained by the long gestation of PPP projects, and the complexity and importance of key decision making processes in the pre-contracting stage to achievement of VFM and other objectives in the operating stage. The
31、evidence indicates the apparent unwillingness of most auditors-general to actively engage with PPP performance and VFM achievement.Objective 2: Determine Whether Audits are Substantive or Systems-Based Analysis of one of the audits classified as systems-based8 (PA6) and the four classified as substa
32、ntive is framed around a number of variables identified as differentiators between the two audit categories. These variables are: the context in which the audit was conducted; its purpose; quotations from the reports to support classification; other notable features, including audit findings/ recomm
33、endations; and an indication of systems-based aspects of substantive audits.Objective 3: Investigate the Influence of Contextual Elements on Substantive Audits The literature poses a link between the decision to undertake a performance audit and the controversy surrounding the audited program or project. It also sug
