IMF高级宏观经济学研修班课程CT1405MMF-L03Moneta.pptx
- 文档编号:15167474
- 上传时间:2023-07-02
- 格式:PPTX
- 页数:95
- 大小:1.48MB
IMF高级宏观经济学研修班课程CT1405MMF-L03Moneta.pptx
《IMF高级宏观经济学研修班课程CT1405MMF-L03Moneta.pptx》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《IMF高级宏观经济学研修班课程CT1405MMF-L03Moneta.pptx(95页珍藏版)》请在冰点文库上搜索。
MonetaryPolicyTransmissionMechanism,CTPTrainingProgramMacroeconomicManagementandFinancialSectorIssuesCT14.05,PresenterTaoWu,ContentOutline,GeneralIssuesaboutMonetaryPolicyObjectives:
Whatmonetarypolicycanandcannotdo.Choiceofpolicyinstruments:
directorindirect?
Choiceofoperatingtarget:
interestrateormonetaryaggregates?
TransmissionMechanism:
Howdoesmonetarypolicywork?
Interestrate,Credit,Assetprice,ExchangerateRecentMonetaryPolicyIssues:
TheU.S.FederalReservesUnconventionalMonetaryPolicyOperations,2,ThistrainingmaterialisthepropertyoftheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andisintendedforuseinIMFInstitutecourses.AnyreuserequiresthepermissionoftheIMFInstitute.”,WhatMonetaryPolicyCanandCannotDo,WhatMonetaryPolicyCanandCannotDo,“Weareindangerofassigningtomonetarypolicyalargerrolethanitcanperform,indangerofaskingittoaccomplishtasksthatitcannotachieve,and,asaresult,indangerofpreventingitfrommakingthecontributionthatitiscapableofmaking.”PresidentialaddressofMiltonFriedmanatthe80thAnnualMeetingoftheAmericanEconomicAssociation,1967.,WhatMonetaryPolicyCanandCannotDo,Long-runeffectsvs.Short-runeffectsMonetarypolicymaybeeffectiveinshortrun,butitseffectsindeterminingtherealeconomicgrowthoremploymentinlongrunarealmostnegligible.Thebestwayformonetarypolicytopromotelong-runeconomicgrowthistoensurepricestability.Pricingsystemworksmoreefficientlytoallocateresourceswhenpricesareonaveragestable;Toavoiddistortionscausedbytheinteractionofinflationandataxsystembasedontheassumptionthatpricesarestable.,WhatMonetaryPolicyCanandCannotDo,Centralbankscannothaveanysubstantialeffectontrendgrowthinoutputortrendgrowthinemployment.policiesbygovernmentthatcanhaveamaterialinfluenceonboth:
education,humancapital,technologicalinnovations,taxation,protectionofprivatepropertyrights,etc.However,bykeepinginflationlowandstable,centralbankscanoperatemonetarypolicywiththeobjectiveofkeepingactualoutputandemploymentascloseaspossibletothetrendofpotentialoutputandemployment.,MonetaryPolicy:
Objectives,PriceStability(lowandstableinflation);ReducedVolatilityofbusinesscycles;CentralbanksmayalsobeconcernedaboutInterestratestabilityandfinancialmarketstability;Exchangeratestability.,MonetaryPolicy:
Objectives,Whatdowemeanbypricestability?
Pricesarenotchangingonaverage.However,individualpricesmayriseorfall.Whynotzeropercentinflation?
UpwardbiasinmeasuredinflationReducetheriskofdeflation(toavoida“liquiditytrap”zeroboundonnominalinterestrates).,Time,GDP,CentralBankmayalsobeabletoreducevolatilityofbusinesscycles,WhatMonetaryPolicyCannotDo:
LessonsfromthePhillipsCurve,Isthereatrade-offbetweeninflationandunemployment?
ThePhillipscurve:
WilliamsPhillips(1958),using97yearsoftheU.K.data,showedatradeoffbetweenunemploymentandnominalwagegrowth.DatafortheUSupto1969showedthesame.Whathappensifacentralbanktriestoexploitcontinuouslytheshort-runtrade-offandwantstopersistentlypushtheunemploymentratebelowitspotentiallevel?
PhillipsCurveintheU.S.:
1960-2007,Trade-offsbetweenInflationandUnemployment,Forinstance,acentralbankmaydecidetoincreasemoneysupplyorkeepinterestrateslow,therebypushesunemploymentratebelowitspotentiallevelatthepriceofahigherinflation,thusthereseemstobeatrade-offinshortrun.However,inflationsurprisescannotstimulateshort-termemploymentveryoften.Inthelongrun,economicagentswilladjusttheirinflationexpectationsaccordingly.Therefore,discretionarypolicieswillmostlikelyendupwithhigherinflationbutnolowerunemployment.,Trade-offsbetweentheVolatilitiesofInflationandUnemployment,Assumethattheobjectiveofacentralbankistominimizewhereisthetargetunemploymentrate;isthetargetinflationrate;istheinflation-aversionparameter.Centralbankscantrademoreunemploymentoroutputvolatilityforlessinflationvolatility,andviceversa.,InstrumentsofMonetaryPolicy,15,OperatingTargets(reserves,moneymarketinterestrate,etc),Indicatorvariables,IntermediateTargets(M2,ER,LTinterestrates,Inflationforecast,etc),PolicyObjectives(lowandstableinflation),MonetaryPolicyFramework,PolicyInstruments(OMO,discountrate,etc),Domesticshocks,Externalshocks,InflationTargeting,PolicyDecision,MonetaryPolicyFramework,Needtoanswerthreequestionswhendesigningamonetarypolicyframework:
Whichpolicyinstrumentstouse?
Directinstrumentsvs.indirectinstruments?
Whatistheoperatingtargetvariable?
Targetingprices(interestrates)orquantities(moneysupply,credit)?
Whatisthemonetarypolicytransmissionmechanism?
Howdoespolicyactionsonoperatingtargettransmittointermediatetargetandthenpolicyobjectives?
Howaccurateandhowfastisthetransmission?
Choicesbetweenpolicyinstruments,intermediatetargets,andfinalobjectivesmustbecompatible.,PolicyInstruments,Whenimplementingmonetarypolicy,centralbankscaneitheractdirectly,usingitsregulatorypower,orindirectly,usingitsinfluenceonmoneymarketconditions.DirectinstrumentsoperatebysettingorlimitingeitherpricesorquantitiesthroughregulationsFocusonthebalancesheetsofcommercialbanks;Indirectinstrumentsactthroughthemarket,byadjustingtheunderlyingdemandfor,andsupplyof,bankreserves;Initialeffectsareonthebalancesheetofthecentralbank.,DirectInstruments,DirectControlsoninterestratesForinstance,minimumandmaximuminterestrates,preferentialratesforcertainloancategories,etc;CreditceilingsAtaggregateleveloronindividualbanks;DirectedlendingpoliciesForinstance,preferentialcentralbankrefinancefacilitiestodirectcredittoprioritysectors;HighreserveandliquidassetrequirementsDesignedbothtoabsorbliquidityandtoprovidegovernmentdeficitfinancing.,DirectInstruments,Effectivemeanstoachievenarrowlydefinedtargets:
Forinstance,maintainingaparticularinterestrateatacertainlevel,orkeepingabanksoverallcreditexpansionbelowacertainceiling,ordirectingcredittoorawayfromspecificsectors.Mosteffectiveorpracticalapproachincountrieswithunder-developedfinancialmarkets;However,themacroeconomiceffectsofthecontrolsishardtopredict,becauseofthescopeforevasionandavoidance.Forinstance,effectivecreditceilingforcesbankstobuildupexcessliquidity,whichinturndiscouragesdeposittakingandcausesdisintermediation.,DirectInstruments,Preventcompetitionandlimittheexpansionofmoreefficientbanks;Discouragecorrectpricingofcreditrisk,thuspreventingfinancialresourcesfrombeingefficientlyallocated;Discouragethedevelopmentofmoneyandcapitalmarkets;Inconsistentwithfreedomofinternationalcapitalmovementandmayencourages“capitalflight.”Createvariousadministrativeproblemsandencouragethedevelopmentofunregulated“grey”marketor“shadowbanking.”,IndirectInstruments,Open-marketoperationsOutrighttransactionsandrepo/reverserepoagreementsStandingfacilities“Lenderoflastresort.”Discountwindow,lendinganddepositfacilities,etc.ReserverequirementsLesspopularinrecentyears;Recenttendencytowardlowerreserverequirements.,IndirectInstruments,Indirectinstrumentsareconsideredmoremarketfriendlyandarelessdistortionarythandirectinstruments.Focusonsystem-wideliquidity;Transmitpolicysignals;Allowforoptimalallocationoffinancialresourcesonthebasisofriskandreturn.Mostcountrieshavemovedoraremovingtowardsusingindirectinstruments.,TransitionalConsiderations,Degreeoffinancialdevelopment.Forinstance,Howdevelopedarethefinancialmarkets?
Howcompetitivearethecommercialbanks?
Howvulnerableisthebankingsector?
Selectionofappropriatetargetvariablesandtheinterpretationofmonetaryindicatorsasguidestopolicy.Difficultiesincontrollingmonetaryaggregatesandcreditgrowthduringandafterthetransition.Agradualapproachmaybepreferred,butnotalways.,ChoiceofOperatingTarget,25,OperatingTargets(reserves,moneymarketinterestrate,etc),Indicatorvariables,IntermediateTargets(M2,ER,LTinterestrates,Inflationforecast,etc),PolicyObjectives(lowandstableinflation),MonetaryPolicyFramework,PolicyInstruments(OMO,discountrate,etc),Domesticshocks,Externalshocks,InflationTargeting,PolicyDecision,ChoiceofOperatingTarget,InstrumentInterestRate,InterestRate,Mo,Ro,M1,Money,Md,R1,Ro,Mo,Money,InterestRate,MoneyTarget,InterestRates(R)vs.MoneyStock(M),ChoiceofOperatingTarget,InterestRates(R)vs.MoneyStock(M)Pooles(1970)conclusion:
Vol.(aggregatedemandshock)Vol.(moneydemandshock)ChooseM;Vol.(aggregatedemandshock)Vol.(moneydemandshock)ChooseR;QuantityTheoryofMoney,ChoiceofMonetaryPolicyInstruments,Inrecentyears,interestrateshavebeenpreferredamongadvancedeconomiesastheprimarymonetarypolicyinstrument.providesamoretransparentsignalofmonetarypolicystance;automaticresponsetomoneydemandshocks,inthefaceoffinancialinnovations.Forinstance,thesimpleTaylorRuleintheU.S.,MonetaryTransmissionMechanism,MonetaryTransmissionMechanism,Howdomonetarypolicyactionsaffectthemacro-economy?
Money-InterestratechannelCreditchannelAssetpricechannelExchangeratechannel,MonetaryPolicy,Marketrates,Assetprices,Expectations/Confidence,Exchangerate,AggregateDemand,Importprices,Inflation,Atransmissionmechanismofmonetarypolicy,Output,Productivity,ExchangeRatePass-Through,PolicyRatePass-Through,32,Traditionalmonetarytransmissionchannel;Theeffectisfeltonthedemandforcredit.MarginalcostofcreditCostsofbusinessinvestmentCostofhousingordurablespurchasesRate
- 配套讲稿:
如PPT文件的首页显示word图标,表示该PPT已包含配套word讲稿。双击word图标可打开word文档。
- 特殊限制:
部分文档作品中含有的国旗、国徽等图片,仅作为作品整体效果示例展示,禁止商用。设计者仅对作品中独创性部分享有著作权。
- 关 键 词:
- IMF 高级 宏观经济学 研修班 课程 CT1405MMF L03Moneta
![提示](https://static.bingdoc.com/images/bang_tan.gif)