股权激励外文文献中英对照.docx
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股权激励外文文献中英对照.docx
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股权激励外文文献中英对照
外文文献原文
TheDiffusionofEquityIncentivePlansinItalianListedCompanies
1。
INTRODUCTION
PaststudieshavebroughttolightthedissimilaritiesinthepaypackagesofmanagersinAnglo—Saxoncountriesascomparedwithothernations(e。
g。
,Bebchuk,FriedandWalker,2002;CheffinsandThomas,2004;Zattoni,2007)。
IntheUKand,aboveallintheUS,remunerationencompassesavarietyofcomponents,andshortandlongtermvariablepaycarriesmoreweightthanelsewhere(ConyonandMurphy,2000).Inothercountries,however,fixedwageshavealwaysbeenthemainingredientintopmanagers’payschemes.Overtime,variableshort—termpayhasbecomemoresubstantialandtheimpactoffringebenefitshasgraduallygrown.Notwithstanding,incentiveslinkedtoreachingmediumtolong-termcompanygoalshaveneverbeenwidelyused(TowersPerrin,2000).
Inrecentyears,however,paypackagesofmanagershaveundergoneanappreciablechangeasvariablepayhasincreasedconsiderably,evenoutsidetheUSandtheUK.Inparticular,managersinmostcountrieshaveexperiencedanincreaseinthevariablepayrelatedtolong—termgoals。
Withinthecontextofthisgeneraltrendtowardmediumandlong-termincentives,thereisapronouncedtendencytoadoptplansinvolvingstocksorstockoptions(TowersPerrin,2000;2005)。
Thedriversofthediffusionoflongtermincentiveplansseemtobesomerecentchangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironmentatthelocalandgloballevels.ParticularlyimportanttriggersoftheconvergencetowardtheUSpayparadigmarebothmarketorienteddrivers,suchastheevolvingshareownershippatternsortheinternationalizationofthelabormarket,andlaw—orienteddrivers,suchascorporateortaxregulation(CheffinsandThomas,2004)。
Drivenbythesechangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironment,weobserveaglobaltrendtowardthe“Americanizationofinternationalpaypractices,"characterizedbyhighincentivesandverylucrativecompensationmechanisms(e。
g。
Cheffins,2003;CheffinsandThomas,2004)。
Ironically,thespreadoftheUSpayparadigmaroundtheworldhappenswhenitishotlydebatedathome。
Inparticular,thecriticsareconcernedwithboththelevelofexecutivecompensationpackagesandtheuseofequityincentiveplans(CheffinsandThomas,2004)。
CriticsstressedthatUStopmanagers,andparticularlytheCEOs,receiveverylucrativecompensationpackages.The’80sand’90ssawanincreasingdisparitybetweenCEO’spayandthatofrank—and-fileworkers。
Thankstothiseffect,theirdirectcompensationhasbecomeahundredtimesthatofanaverageemployee(HallandLiebman,1998).ThemaindeterminantsoftheincreasinglevelofCEOs’andexecutives’compensationareannualbonusesand,aboveall,stockoptiongrants(ConyonandMurphy,2000)。
Stockoptionplanshaverecentlybeencriticizedbyscholarsandpublicopinionbecausetheycharacteristicallyaretoogenerousandsymptomaticofamanagerialextractionofthefirm’svalue(Bebchuketal。
,2002;BebchukandFried,2006)。
Inlightoftheserecenteventsandoftheincreasedtendencytoadoptequityincentiveplans,thispaperaimsatunderstandingthereasonsbehindthedisseminationofstockoptionandstockgrantingplansoutsidetheUSandtheUK。
ThechoicetoinvestigatethisphenomenoninItalyreliesonthefollowingarguments.First,thelargemajorityofpreviousstudiesanalyzetheevolutionofexecutivecompensationandequityincentiveplansintheUSand,toasmallerextent,intheUK.Second,ownershipstructureandgovernancepracticesincontinentalEuropeancountriesaresubstantiallydifferentfromtheonesinAnglo—Saxoncountries。
Third,continentalEuropeancountries,andItalyinparticular,almostignoredtheuseoftheseinstrumentsuntiltheendofthe’90s.
Ourgoalistocomparetheexplanatorypowerofthreecompetingviewsonthediffusionofequityincentiveplans:
1)theoptimalcontractingview,whichstatesthatcompensationpackagesaredesignedtominimizeagencycostsbetweenmanagersandshareholders(JensenandMurphy,1990);2)therentextractionview,whichstatesthatpowerfulinsidersmayinfluencethepayprocessfortheirownbenefit(Bebchuketal。
,2002);and3)theperceived-costview(HallandMurphy,2003),whichstatesthatcompaniesmayfavorsomecompensationschemesfortheir(supposedorreal)costadvantages.
Tothispurpose,weconductedanempiricalstudyonthereasonswhyItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentiveplanssincetheendofthe’90s。
Togainadeepunderstandingofthephenomenon,wecollecteddataandinformationbothontheevolutionofthenationalinstitutionalenvironmentinthelastdecadeandonthediffusionandthecharacteristics(i.e。
,technicalaspectsandobjectives)ofequityincentiveplansadoptedbyItalianlistedcompaniesin1999and2005.Weusedbothlogitmodelsanddifference-of-meansstatisticaltechniquestoanalyzedata.Ourresultsshowthat:
1)firmsize,andnotitsownershipstructure,isadeterminantoftheadoptionoftheseinstruments;2)theseplansarenotextensivelyusedtoextractcompanyvalue,althoughafewcasessuggestthispossibility;and3)plans’characteristicsareconsistentwiththeonesdefinedbytaxlawtoreceivespecialfiscaltreatment.
Ourfindingscontributetothedevelopmentoftheliteratureonboththerationalesbehindthespreadingofequityincentiveschemesandthediffusionofnewgovernancepractices.Theyshow,infact,thatequityincentiveplanshavebeenprimarilyadoptedtotakeadvantageoflargetaxbenefits,andthatinsomeoccasionstheymayhavebeenusedbycontrollingshareholderstoextractcompanyvalueattheexpenseofminorityshareholders。
Inotherwords,ourfindingssuggestthatItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentiveplanstoperformasubtleformofdecoupling。
Ontheonehand,theydeclaredthatplanswereaimedtoalignshareholders’andmanagers’interestsandincentivevaluecreation.Ontheotherhand,thankstothelackoftransparencyandpreviousknowledgeabouttheseinstruments,companiesusedthesemechanismstotakeadvantageoftaxbenefitsandsometimesalsotodistributealargeamountofvaluetosomepowerfulindividuals。
Theseresultssupportasymbolicperspectiveoncorporategovernance,accordingtowhichtheintroductionofequityincentiveplanspleasestakeholders–fortheirimplicitalignmentofinterestsandincentivetovaluecreation–withoutimplyingasubstantiveimprovementofgovernancepractices.
2。
CorporateGovernanceinItalianListedCompanies
Italiancompaniesaretraditionallycontrolledbyalargeblockholder(Zattoni,1999).Banksandotherfinancialinstitutionsdonotownlargeshareholdingsanddonotexertasignificantinfluenceongovernanceoflargecompanies,atleastasfarastheyareabletorepaytheirfinancialdebt(Bianchi,BiancoandEnriques,2001)。
Institutionalinvestorsusuallyplayamarginalrolebecauseoftheirlimitedshareholding,theirstrictconnectionswithItalianbanks,andaregulatoryenvironmentthatdoesnotofferincentivesfortheiractivism。
Finally,thestockmarketisrelativelysmallandundeveloped,andthemarketforcorporatecontrolisalmostabsent(Bianco,2001).Inshort,theItaliangovernancesystemcanbedescribedasasystemof“weakmanagers,strongblockholders,andunprotectedminorityshareholders”(Melis,2000:
354).
Theboardofdirectorsistraditionallyonetier,butashareholders'generalmeetingmustappointalsoaboardofstatutoryauditorsaswellwhosemaintaskistomonitorthedirectors’performance(Melis,2000)。
Further,somestudiespublishedinthe’90sshowedthattheboardofdirectorswasundertherelevantinfluenceoflargeblockholders。
Bothinsideandoutsidedirectorswereinfactrelatedtocontrollingshareholdersbyfamilyorbusinessties(Melis,1999;2000;Molteni,1997)。
Consistentwiththispicture,fixedwageshavebeenthemainingredientoftopmanagers'remuneration,andincentiveschemeslinkedtoreachingmediumtolongtermcompanygoalshaveneverbeenwidelyused(Melis,1999)。
EquityincentiveschemesadoptedbyItaliancompaniesissuestockstoallemployeesunconditionallyforthepurposeofimprovingthecompanyatmosphereandstabilizingthesharevalueontheStockExchange.Onlyveryfewcanbecomparedwithstockoptionplansinthetruesenseoftheterm。
Eveninthiscase,however,directorsandtopmanagerswererarelyevaluatedthroughstockreturns,becauseofthesupposedlimitedabilityoftheItalianstockmarkettomeasurefirm’sperformance(Melis,1999)。
3。
TheEvolutionofItalianInstitutionalContext
TheinstitutionalcontextinItalyhasevolvedradicallyinthelastdecade,creatingthepossibilityforthedisseminationofequityincentiveplans。
Themainchangesregardedthedevelopmentofcommerciallaw,theintroductionandupdatingofthecodeofgoodgovernance,theissueofsomereportsencouragingtheuseofequityincentiveplans,andtheevolutionofthetaxlaw(Zattoni,2006).
Concerningthenationallawandregulations,somereformsinthecommerciallaw(1998,2003,and2005)andtheintroduction(1999)andupdate(2002)ofthenationalcodeofgoodgovernancecontributedtotheimprovementofthecorporategovernanceoflistedcompanies(Zattoni,2006)。
FinancialmarketsandcorporatelawreformsimprovedtheefficiencyoftheStockExchangeandcreatedaninstitutionalenvironmentmorefavorabletoinstitutionalinvestors’activism(BianchiandEnriques,2005).Atthesametimetheintroductionandupdateofthecodeofgoodgovernancecontributedtotheimprovementofgovernancepracticesattheboardlevel。
ThesereformsdidnotproduceanimmediateeffectongovernancepracticesofItalianlistedcompanies,alt
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