股权投资管理 研发.docx
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股权投资管理 研发.docx
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股权投资管理研发
Banks,stockmarkets,andChina's‘greatleapforward’
InternationalJournalofProjectManagement
Public–privatepartnership(PPP)organisationalapproachestogeneration,managementandoperationofnetworkinfrastructureandserviceshavewidelyfollowedcompetitivemarketformsunderdifferentregulatoryregimes.ManagerialdecisionsonfinancingofPPPcompanieshavebeengovernedbyregulatorymarketswithunstableinstitutionsindevelopingandemergingeconomies.Whiledebtownershipinthecapitalstructureisoftensharedbyadditionalfinancierslikedevelopmentandmultilateralbanks,uniqueagencyissuesseememergingfromdebtandequityownershiparrangementsofregulatedPPPorganisations.WithinatheoreticalframeworkoffinancingofPPPorganisationsexplainedbytheoryofthefirm,thisresearchlooksintonature,formanduniquegovernanceissuesindebtandequityarrangementsinregulatedPPPorganisations.AnalysisissupportedbyasurveyondebtandequityarrangementsinregulatedPPPorganisationsacrossdifferentinfrastructuresectorsanddevelopingenvironments.Findingsrevealthatdebthasnotbeenaneffectivemechanismtocontrolmanagers’behavioursincesubordinatefinancingalsofunctionstoaddressdebtagencyinthecapitalstructureofthoseregulatedPPPorganisations.Thus,resultssuggestthattyingperformanceofmanagerswiththefinancialstructureofregulatedPPPorganisationisunderminedindevelopingandemergingeconomies.Thesegovernanceissuesneedtobeconsideredforalternativebenchmarkstoassessefficiencyofinfrastructurecompaniesunderdifferentregulatoryregimesforbetterinfrastructureinvestmentperformanceindevelopingenvironments.
ArticleOutline
1.Introduction
2.Theoreticalframeworkoffinancingofpublic–privatepartnershiporganisations
3.Analysisofcorporategovernanceoffinancingofpublicprivatepartnershiporganisations
4.Conclusion
Acknowledgements
References
Governanceissuesinfinancingofpublic–privatepartnershiporganisationsinnetworkinfrastructureindustries
InternationalJournalofProjectManagement
Public–privatepartnership(PPP)organisationalapproachestogeneration,managementandoperationofnetworkinfrastructureandserviceshavewidelyfollowedcompetitivemarketformsunderdifferentregulatoryregimes.ManagerialdecisionsonfinancingofPPPcompanieshavebeengovernedbyregulatorymarketswithunstableinstitutionsindevelopingandemergingeconomies.Whiledebtownershipinthecapitalstructureisoftensharedbyadditionalfinancierslikedevelopmentandmultilateralbanks,uniqueagencyissuesseememergingfromdebtandequityownershiparrangementsofregulatedPPPorganisations.WithinatheoreticalframeworkoffinancingofPPPorganisationsexplainedbytheoryofthefirm,thisresearchlooksintonature,formanduniquegovernanceissuesindebtandequityarrangementsinregulatedPPPorganisations.AnalysisissupportedbyasurveyondebtandequityarrangementsinregulatedPPPorganisationsacrossdifferentinfrastructuresectorsanddevelopingenvironments.Findingsrevealthatdebthasnotbeenaneffectivemechanismtocontrolmanagers’behavioursincesubordinatefinancingalsofunctionstoaddressdebtagencyinthecapitalstructureofthoseregulatedPPPorganisations.Thus,resultssuggestthattyingperformanceofmanagerswiththefinancialstructureofregulatedPPPorganisationisunderminedindevelopingandemergingeconomies.Thesegovernanceissuesneedtobeconsideredforalternativebenchmarkstoassessefficiencyofinfrastructurecompaniesunderdifferentregulatoryregimesforbetterinfrastructureinvestmentperformanceindevelopingenvironments.
ArticleOutline
1.Introduction
2.Theoreticalframeworkoffinancingofpublic–privatepartnershiporganisations
3.Analysisofcorporategovernanceoffinancingofpublicprivatepartnershiporganisations
4.Conclusion
Acknowledgements
References
Assessingoutputandproductivitygrowthinthebankingindustry
TheQuarterlyReviewofEconomicsandFinance
ThispaperassessestheevolutionofoutputandproductivityintheGreekbankingindustryfortheperiod1990–2006.Threemaincategoriesofbankoutputwereestimatedbasedonmoderntheoreticalapproaches,whilefortheestimationofoutputandproductivity(partialandtotalfactor)wereliedontheindexnumbermethod(Tornqvistindex).Wealsoconsideredtheeffectoflaborqualityonbanks’productivityandthecontributionoftotalfactorproductivitytobankoutputgrowth.BankoutputandlaborproductivityoutpacedconsiderablytherespectiveGDPgrowthandlaborproductivityoftheGreekeconomyduringtheperiodunderexamination.Capitalandtotalfactorproductivityhavealsoimprovedremarkablymainlysince1999,duetothestructuralchangesthattookplacewithintheindustry,capital(mainlyIT)investmentsandimprovementinthequalityofhumancapital.
ArticleOutline
1.Introduction
2.Literaturereview
2.1.Measuringbankoutput
2.2.Empiricalstudiesforbankoutputandproductivity
3.MeasuringtheoutputofGreekbanks
3.1.Financialintermediationservices
3.2.Paymentservices
3.3.“Other”services
3.4.Totaloutput
4.Conceptandmeasurementofproductivity
4.1.Partialandtotalfactorproductivity
4.2.MethodsofTFPmeasurement
4.2.1.Solowgrowthaccountingmethod
4.2.2.Indexnumbermethod
4.2.3.Distancefunctionmethod
4.2.4.Econometricmethod
4.3.MeasuringtheproductivityofGreekbanks
4.3.1.Theinfluenceoflaborqualityonproductivitymeasurement
5.EmpiricalresultsforGreekbanks
5.1.Bankoutput
5.2.Bankinputs
5.3.Bankproductivity
5.3.1.Laborproductivity
5.3.2.Capitalproductivity
5.3.3.Totalfactorproductivity
5.3.4.TFPcontributiontooutputgrowth
5.4.BankoutputandlaborproductivityinsomeEuropeancountries
6.Conclusions
Acknowledgements
AppendixA.Appendix
References
Legalityandventurecapitalexits
JournalofCorporateFinance
ThispaperintroducesananalysisoftheimpactofLegalityontheexitingofventurecapitalinvestments.Weconsiderasampleof468venture-backedcompaniesfrom12Asia-Pacificcountries,andthesecountries'venturecapitalists'investmentsinUS-basedentrepreneurialfirms.ThedataindicateIPOsaremorelikelyincountrieswithahigherLegalityindex.Thiscoreresultisrobusttocontrolsforcountry-specificstockmarketcapitalization,MSCImarketconditions,venturecapitalistfundmanagerskillandfundcharacteristics,andentrepreneurialfirmandtransactioncharacteristics.AlthoughBlackandGilson(1998)[Black,B.S.,Gilson,R.J.,1998.Venturecapitalandthestructureofcapitalmarkets:
banksversusstockmarkets.JournalofFinancialEconomics47,243–77]speculateonacentralconnectionbetweenactivestockmarketsandactiveventurecapitalmarkets,ourdatainfactindicatethequalityofacountry'slegalsystemismuchmoredirectlyconnectedtofacilitatingVC-backedIPOexitsthanthesizeofacountry'sstockmarket.ThedataindicateLegalityisacentralmechanismwhichmitigatesagencyproblemsbetweenoutsideshareholdersandentrepreneurs,therebyfosteringthemutualdevelopmentofIPOmarketsandventurecapitalmarkets.
ArticleOutline
1.Introduction
2.Institutionalstructureandhypotheses
2.1.Legalityandventurecapitalexits
2.2.Economicandgovernancefactorsaffectingventurecapitalexits
3.Dataandsummarystatistics
3.1.Datadescription
3.2.Univariatecomparisontests
3.3.Correlationmatrix
4.Multivariateanalysesofexitoutcomes
4.1.Multinomiallogitestimates
4.2.Sampleselectivitycorrectedestimates
5.Limitations,alternativeexplanationsandfutureresearch
6.Concludingremarks
References
Commercialbankunderwritingofcredit-enhancedbonds:
aretherecertificationbenefitstotheissuer?
JournalofInternationalMoneyandFinance
Recentstudieshaveexpandedthecommercialbankcertificationhypothesistoincludebanksactinginanunderwritingcapacity.Thispaperfurtherdevelopsthatresearchbyfocusingontheindustrialrevenuebondmarketinwhichbankshavetheuniqueopportunitytosimultaneouslyactasbothcreditguarantorandunderwriter.Whenexplicitlyallowingforbank-issuedstandbylettersofcredit(guarantees),wefindsignificantlygreateryieldspreadsforthosebondsunderwrittenbycommercialbankscomparedtobondsunderwrittenbyinvestmentbanks.Overall,nonetbenefitappearstoaccruetothebondissuerwhenattemptingtoachievejoint(ordouble)certificationbenefitsbyemployingcommercialbanksasbothcreditguarantorandunderwritersexceptinthespecialcasewherethesamebankactsasbothguarantorandunderwriter.Thislimitedcertificationeffectisfurthervalidatedwhenthecreditqualityofparticipatingbanksisaccountedfor.Thisresultisconsistentwithan“economyofscope”inmonitoringandreusinginformation.
ArticleOutline
1.Introduction
2.Industrialrevenuebondmarket
3.Sampleandempiricalmethodology
3.1.Sampleofindustrialrevenuesbonds
3.2.Empiricaltestsandmodelparameters
4.Empiricalresults
5.Summaryandconclusions
Acknowledgements
AppendixA
References
TheroleofinvestmentbanksinM&Atransactions:
Feesandservices
Pacific-BasinFinanceJournal
WeexaminethepricingandperformanceofadvisersinM&Atransactions.WedetermineadviserqualityonthebasisofacontemporaneousmarketsharemeasureandshowthathighqualityadvisersreceivehigherM&Aadvisoryfees.Highqualityadvisersalsocompletedealsfaster,buttheirsuperiorityisnotreflectedinincreasingthelikelihoodofdealcompletionordeliveringgreaterabnormalequityreturnstotheirclients.Itiswellknownthatstockbids
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