平狄克微观经济学课件(英文)17.ppt
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平狄克微观经济学课件(英文)17.ppt
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Fernando&YvonnQuijanoPreparedby:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation17CHAPTERCopyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation2of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.CHAPTER17OUTLINE17.1QualityUncertaintyandtheMarketforLemons17.2MarketSignaling17.3MoralHazard17.4ThePrincipalAgentProblem17.5ManagerialIncentivesinanIntegratedFirm17.6AsymmetricInformationinLaborMarkets:
EfficiencyWageTheoryChapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation3of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1asymmetricinformationSituationinwhichabuyerandasellerpossessdifferentinformationaboutatransaction.TheMarketforUsedCarsTheMarketforUsedCarsFigure17.1Whensellersofproductshavebetterinformationaboutproductqualitythanbuyers,a“lemonsproblem”mayariseinwhichlow-qualitygoodsdriveouthighqualitygoods.In(a)thedemandcurveforhigh-qualitycarsisDH.However,asbuyerslowertheirexpectationsabouttheaveragequalityofcarsonthemarket,theirperceiveddemandshiftstoDM.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation4of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheMarketforUsedCarsTheMarketforUsedCars(continued)Figure17.1Likewise,in(b)theperceiveddemandcurveforlow-qualitycarsshiftsfromDLtoDM.Asaresult,thequantityofhigh-qualitycarssoldfallsfrom50,000to25,000,andthequantityoflow-qualitycarssoldincreasesfrom50,000to75,000.Eventually,onlylowqualitycarsaresold.asymmetricinformationSituationinwhichabuyerandasellerpossessdifferentinformationaboutatransaction.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation5of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheMarketforUsedCarsThelemonsproblem:
Withasymmetricinformation,low-qualitygoodscandrivehigh-qualitygoodsoutofthemarket.ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationAdverseSelectionadverseselectionFormofmarketfailureresultingwhenproductsofdifferentqualitiesaresoldatasinglepricebecauseofasymmetricinformation,sothattoomuchofthelow-qualityproductandtoolittleofthehigh-qualityproductaresold.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation6of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationTheMarketforInsuranceTheMarketforCreditPeoplewhobuyinsuranceknowmuchmoreabouttheirgeneralhealththananyinsurancecompanycanhopetoknow,evenifitinsistsonamedicalexamination.Asaresult,adverseselectionarises,muchasitdoesinthemarketforusedcars.Creditcardcompaniesandbankscan,tosomeextent,usecomputerizedcredithistories,whichtheyoftensharewithoneanother,todistinguishlow-qualityfromhigh-qualityborrowers.Manypeople,however,thinkthatcomputerizedcredithistoriesinvadetheirprivacy.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation7of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheImportanceofReputationandStandardizationAsymmetricinformationisalsopresentinmanyothermarkets.Herearejustafewexamples:
Retailstores:
Willthestorerepairorallowyoutoreturnadefectiveproduct?
Dealersofrarestamps,coins,books,andpaintings:
Aretheitemsrealorcounterfeit?
Roofers,plumbers,andelectricians:
Whenarooferrepairsorrenovatestheroofofyourhouse,doyouclimbuptocheckthequalityofthework?
Restaurants:
Howoftendoyougointothekitchentocheckifthechefisusingfreshingredientsandobeyinghealthlaws?
Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation8of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1Asymmetricinformationisprominentinthefree-agentmarket.Onepotentialpurchaser,theplayersoriginalteam,hasbetterinformationabouttheplayersabilitiesthanotherteamshave.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation9of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MARKETSIGNALING17.2marketsignalingProcessbywhichsellerssendsignalstobuyersconveyinginformationaboutproductquality.Tobestrong,asignalmustbeeasierforhigh-productivitypeopletogivethanforlow-productivitypeopletogive,sothathigh-productivitypeoplearemorelikelytogiveit.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation10of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MARKETSIGNALING17.2ASimpleModelofJobMarketSignalingEquilibriumSignalingFigure17.2Educationcanbeausefulsignalofthehighproductivityofagroupofworkersifeducationiseasiertoobtainforthisgroupthanforalow-productivitygroup.In(a),thelow-productivitygroupwillchooseaneducationlevelofy=0becausethecostofeducationisgreaterthantheincreasedearningsresultingfromeducation.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation11of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MARKETSIGNALING17.2ASimpleModelofJobMarketSignalingEquilibriumSignalingFigure17.2Educationcanbeausefulsignalofthehighproductivityofagroupofworkersifeducationiseasiertoobtainforthisgroupthanforalow-productivitygroup.However,in(b),thehigh-productivitygroupwillchooseaneducationlevelofy*=4becausethegaininearningsisgreaterthanthecost.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation12of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MARKETSIGNALING17.2ASimpleModelofJobMarketSignalingCostBenefitComparisonIndecidinghowmucheducationtoobtain,peoplecomparethebenefitofeducationwiththecost.Peopleineachgroupmakethefollowingcost-benefitcalculation:
Obtaintheeducationlevely*ifthebenefit(i.e.,theincreaseinearnings)isatleastaslargeasthecostofthiseducation.GuaranteesandWarrantiesFirmsthatproduceahigher-quality,moredependableproductmustmakeconsumersawareofthisdifference.Buthowcantheydoitinaconvincingway?
Theanswerisguaranteesandwarranties.Guaranteesandwarrantieseffectivelysignalproductqualitybecauseanextensivewarrantyismorecostlyfortheproducerofalow-qualityitemthanfortheproducerofahigh-qualityitem.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation13of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MARKETSIGNALING17.2Jobmarketsignalingdoesnotendwhenoneishired.Thisisespeciallytrueforworkersinknowledge-basedfieldssuchasengineering,computerprogramming,finance,law,management,andconsulting.Giventhisasymmetricinformation,whatpolicyshouldemployersusetodeterminepromotionsandsalaryincreases?
Workerscanoftensignaltalentandproductivitybyworkingharderandlongerhours.Employersrelyincreasinglyonthesignalingvalueoflonghoursasrapidtechnologicalchangemakesitharderforthemtofindotherwaysofassessingworkersskillsandproductivity.Theworkerwillknowmoreabouthisabilitiesthantheemployer.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation14of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MORALHAZARD17.3moralhazardWhenapartywhoseactionsareunobservedcanaffecttheprobabilityormagnitudeofapaymentassociatedwithanevent.TheEffectsofMoralHazardFigure17.3Moralhazardalterstheabilityofmarketstoallocateresourcesefficiently.Dgivesthedemandforautomobiledriving.Withnomoralhazard,themarginalcostoftransportationMCis$1.50permile;thedriverdrives100miles,whichistheefficientamount.Withmoralhazard,thedriverperceivesthecostpermiletobeMC=$1.00anddrives140miles.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation15of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MORALHAZARD17.3Forbuyersoflivestock,informationabouttheanimalshealthisveryimportant.Becauseofasymmetricinformationinthelivestockmarket,moststatesrequirewarrantiesonthesaleoflivestock.Althoughwarrantiessolvetheproblemofthesellerhavingbetterinformationthanthebuyer,theyalsocreateaformofmoralhazard.Inresponsetothemoralhazardproblem,manystateshavemodifiedtheiranimalwarrantylawsbyrequiringsellerstotellbuyerswhetherlivestockarediseasedatthetimeofsale.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation16of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.THEPRINCIPALAGENTPROBLEM17.4principalagentproblemProblemarisingwhenagents(e.g.,afirmsmanagers)pursuetheirowngoalsratherthanthegoalsofprincipals(e.g.,thefirmsowners).agentIndividualemployedbyaprincipaltoachievetheprincipalsobjective.principalIndividualwhoemploysoneormoreagentstoachieveanobjective.Chapter17:
MarketswithAsymmetricInformation17of28Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.THEPRINCIPALAGENTPROBLEM17.4ThePrincipalAgentProbleminPrivateEnterprisesMostlargefirmsarecontrolledbymanagement.Manage
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